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Abstract
Marketization and quantification have become ingrained in academia over the past few decades. The trust in numbers
and incentives has led to a proliferation of devices that individualize, induce, benchmark, and rank academic performance.
As an instantiation of that trend, this article focuses on the establishment and contestation of ‘algorithmic allocation’ at
a Dutch university medical centre. Algorithmic allocation is a form of data-driven automated reasoning that enables uni-
versity administrators to calculate the overall research budget of a department without engaging in a detailed qualitative
assessment of the current content and future potential of its research activities. It consists of a range of quantitative per-
formance indicators covering scientific publications, peer recognition, PhD supervision, and grant acquisition. Drawing
on semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and document analysis, we contrast the attempt to build a rationale for al-
gorithmic allocation—citing unfair advantage, competitive achievement, incentives, and exchange—with the attempt to
challenge that rationale based on existing epistemic differences between departments. From the specifics of the case, we
extrapolate to considerations of epistemic and market fairness that might equally be at stake in other attempts to govern
the production of scientific knowledge in a quantitative and market-oriented way.
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1. Introduction
Large research organizations need to address a question
that is at once moral and technical: How to allocate re-
sources across different departments to effectively fos-
ter certain organizational goals and be perceived as gen-
erally fair at the very same time. The organization cen-
tral to this article—a university medical centre—sought
the answer to this question in an allocation model based
on quantitative performance criteria and departmental
competition. More specifically, the Centre intended to
‘stimulate the control of the (financial) business opera-
tion through the implementation of performance-based
financing at the departmental level’ and to gauge excel-
lence in research ‘based on objective andmeasurable cri-
teria’ such as ‘the citation score and impact factor’ (doc-
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ument 1; document 5). In 2015 and 2016, the board of
directors was engaged in an iterative process of develop-
ing an allocation algorithm together with financial con-
trollers and (bio)medical scientists. Algorithmic alloca-
tion, as we call it, is a form of quantitative reasoning that
makes it possible to calculate the costs and the achieve-
ments of a department without engaging in a detailed
qualitative assessment of the current content and future
potential of its research activities. This form of reasoning
did not come out of thin air. In fact, it fits into a history of
attempts to induce departments to increase their scien-
tific performance which is underpinned by entrenched
ideas of fairness and effectiveness in research manage-
ment. Entrenched as these ideas might be, the board de-
cided to put the model on hold only two years after it
had been introduced. In that short timeframe, algorith-
mic allocation had become controversial for the way it
affected the research capacity of different departments.
As one interviewee put it succinctly: ‘I think in fact that
you do not have a backbone, sort of, when you say: “Yes,
we will let the algorithm decide where the money will go
to”’ (professor 2).
Algorithmic allocation is tied to a particular orga-
nizational setting at a particular time and simultane-
ously linked to more generic developments in higher
education—and society at large—such as quantification,
marketization, and algorithm-based decision making.
Over the past four decades, quantitative performance in-
dicators and market-oriented ideals and practices have
become more significant in academia. University rank-
ings, for instance, have re-emerged at the beginning
of this millennium at the intersection of private initia-
tives and a new field of research analytics and secured
themselves a strong position in university management
(Hammarfelt, de Rijcke, & Wouters, 2017; Paradeise &
Filliatreau, 2016; Paradeise & Thoenig, 2018; Sauder &
Espeland, 2009). Beyond managerial contexts, quanti-
tative indicators such as the Journal Impact Factor—
as a proxy for the quality of scientific journals—and
the H-index—as a proxy for the quality of a scientist—
have also consolidated themselves on the shop floor
of academic research (Rushforth & de Rijcke, 2015,
2017; Rushforth, Franssen, & de Rijcke, 2018). The in-
creased emphasis on competition, incentivization, and
the economic value of research has led social scientists
to speak of ‘market universities’ and ‘epistemic capital-
ism’ as the new academic status quo (Berman, 2012;
Birch, 2017; Fochler, 2016; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2009).
Sociologists and newmedia studies scholars have further
explored the ways in which marketization and quantifi-
cation are tied to increasing automation and algorithmic
calculation (Berman & Hirschman, 2018; Couldry, 2016;
Finn, 2017; van Dijck, 2013). In an ‘algorithmic culture’
(Striphas, 2015), human thoughts and conducts are eas-
ily expressed in the logic of big data. These computa-
tional practices are further embedded in highly conse-
quential decision-making processes in a wide range of
domains: Who should obtain a visa? Who should be con-
sidered a risk to society? Who deserves to be rewarded?
And which product or service will satisfy our desires?
When value is increasingly measured computationally
and algorithms inform—or make—decisions, it is imper-
ative to better understand the way algorithms are de-
signed and how they shape public spheres.
This article focuses on higher education as one of the
key areas of social life where market-oriented practices,
quantitative performance indicators, and algorithm-
based decision-making processes have made large in-
roads. More particularly, it extends the literature dis-
cussed above in the direction of the normative consid-
erations that people offer to support or problematize
these developments. For whatever their actual conse-
quences, such developments do not take place without
attempts being made to support or challenge them. The
research question of our article is analytical: Which nor-
mative considerations do researchers and administrators
draw upon to justify or criticize algorithm-based decision
making in academia?We provide an answer to this ques-
tion based on focus groups, semi-structured interviews,
and document analysis. More specifically, we untangle
two rival notions of fairness at play in research man-
agement: Considerations of ‘market fairness’ are offered
in support of algorithmic allocation whereas considera-
tions of ‘epistemic fairness’ are offered as a challenge
to it (Section 2). Our analysis starts with an overview of
the current state of algorithmic allocation at the univer-
sity medical centre (Section 3). Subsequently, we ana-
lyze the construction of a market-oriented justification
that merges a critique of ‘unfair’ privileges with an em-
phasis on ‘fair’ competition, incentives, and exchange
(Section 4). We conclude our analysis with attempts
to challenge algorithmic allocation by those who stress
the unfairness of a uniform model given the significant
epistemic differences between departments (Section 5).
Some people might be more inclined to favour consid-
eration of market fairness over considerations of epis-
temic fairness (and vice versa). But it is important to
keep in mind that the central tension between the two
is not only found between relatively fixed sets of actors
but also within actors themselves. Based on our ana-
lytic distinction, we caution against having a narrow per-
spective of research organizations as being relatively ho-
mogenous entities andmere recipients of broader trends
in academia, and furthermore, we offer a set of ques-
tions to enable researchers and research managers to
think reflexively about algorithm-based decision-making
(Section 6).
2. Conceptualizing Market Fairness and Epistemic
Fairness: Theory and Method
Markets are important economic phenomena but they
are equally important for themoral justifications they en-
able. Sociologists have theorized howmarkets are linked
to particular ‘moral views’ on what binds people to-
gether (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006; Fourcade & Healy,
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2007). Four main aspects of this ‘market bond’ have
been highlighted. Firstly, Boltanski and Thevenot (2006,
pp. 196–197) speak of it as a relatively coherent set
of normative principles which place much emphasis on
‘competition between beings placed in a state of rivalry’
and on the value of competitive achievement. Second,
to get ahead in a competitive environment, people lend
themselves ‘willingly to every opportunity to engage in
a transaction’ and should thus be enabled to exchange
goods and services as they see fit (Boltanski & Thevenot,
2006, p. 200). The third aspect of the market bond is
that competition and exchange should induce people to
work for the benefits of others—not just for themselves.
In that sense, ‘market systems are supposed to provide
incentives and opportunities for innovation’ (Fourcade
& Healy, 2007, p. 290). Fourth, markets are considered
to be a fair allocation system vis-à-vis a system of gov-
ernment interventions that privilege some at the cost
of others. Thinking along these lines, ‘competitive eco-
nomic arrangements are the best defence…against arbi-
trary interference’ (Fourcade & Healy, 2007, p. 290). In
our case, ‘market fairness’ is the analytical term that cap-
tures these four normative considerations—competitive
achievement, exchange, incentivization, and limiting ar-
bitrary interference—with which researchers and admin-
istrators build an organizational rationale to support al-
gorithmic allocation.
Considerations of market fairness are important but
not the sole source of normativity. As we briefly dis-
cussed, algorithmic allocation quickly became controver-
sial for its practical consequences and its normative un-
derpinnings. Researchers and administrators highlight
major differences in the way scientific knowledge is pro-
duced in different departments to dispute the alleged
fairness of a uniformallocationmodel. The idea that prac-
tices of knowledge production vary greatly is not new to
scholars in Science and Technology Studies, an interdis-
ciplinary field of social scientists who study the social,
material, and cognitive aspects of scientific inquiry and
technological developments. Knorr-Cetina (1999), for in-
stance, has coined the term ‘epistemic cultures’ to cap-
ture differences in the environment, procedures, and ob-
jects of different research communities as well as the
different affordances and constraints these communities
experience (see also Borgman, 2017; Franssen, Scholten,
Hessels, & de Rijcke, 2018; Hessels, Franssen, Scholten,
& de Rijcke, 2019). Following Knorr-Cetina, we can say
that a university medical centre is unified in its focus on
the understanding, prevention, and treatment of illness
but internally divided in terms of the underlying epis-
temic cultures. The considerations of ‘epistemic fairness’
we discerned call algorithmic allocation into question by
highlighting crucial differences in material costs, techno-
logical requirements, access to resources, and collabora-
tion and publication practices.
To analyse rival considerations of fairness in research
management, we combined semi-structured interviews
with focus groups and document analysis. The first, ex-
ploratory research phase of our research project con-
sisted of two focus groups with six early career and eight
senior (bio)medical researchers, one interview with the
dean and one interview with three research policy advi-
sors. The interviews and focus groups initially zoomed in
on ideals of responsible (bio)medical research and on in-
struments to foster innovative and societally relevant re-
search practices. The analysis of the interview transcripts
led to the selection of three main areas of organizational
change at the centre: reorganizing research, measuring
and visualizing scientific output, and evaluating and re-
warding scientists. These three themes were central to
the second, more focused research phase. This second
phase consisted of eight additional interviews with re-
searchers as well as staff members in key advisory po-
sitions within the Centre: two research policy advisors,
two financial controllers, and four professors involved
in central management. In addition to the analysis of
interview transcripts and notes, the article is based on
a series of documents that capture different features
of research organization, measurement, and evaluation
at the Centre: The annual reports on the financial and
organizational state of the Centre over an eleven-year
period; two five-year plans in which the Centre gives a
broadoutline of themain developments and strategies in
(bio)medical research and healthcare practices; the hir-
ing and promotion procedures for associates and full pro-
fessors; website material; a dissertation on early devel-
opments in resource allocation (not in the bibliography
for reasons of anonymity); documents about the new
resource allocation model; as well as internal presenta-
tions about the model before it was put into practice
(see Table 1 for a detailed overview of the interviews and
focus groups and the selection of documents used for
this study).
3. Algorithmic Allocation: Towards a Metric-Based
Model
In a very basic form, algorithmic allocation goes back
to the very establishment of the medical centre dur-
ing a wave of mergers between academic hospitals and
university-based medical faculties in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. At the time, the board of directors decided to
put a small part of its research budget in a separate fund
from which it was subsequently distributed back to the
departments based on two rather straightforward perfor-
mance criteria: the number of doctorates and the num-
ber of ‘full-time equivalents’ acquired through external
funding. That allocationmodel remainedmore or less un-
changed for over a decade (document 6). Only recently,
in 2015, did the board decide to shift from ‘performance-
based funding’ to ‘performance-based financing.’ More
than a mere semantic change, the intended reform was
substantial: ‘[S]o we moved on by allotting all gains and
all costs to the department. And we made a part of it
variable, a pretty large part of it at that’ (financial con-
troller 1). Two substantial changes stand out.
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First, performance-based financing went far beyond
performance-based funding in making departments re-
sponsible for the costs they made in conducting their re-
search. In terms of overhead costs, departments were
now required to pay the central administration for the
use of office and laboratory space—in square meters—
and for the number of their employees (as a param-
eter to divide all overhead costs). The integration of
such costs into the allocation model was not primarily
driven by developments inside the field of (bio)medical
research but came primarily from healthcare (financial
controller 2). An earlier political push for the marketi-
zation of Dutch healthcare had led hospitals to become
more sensitive to the costs and the rewards of medical
interventions. Putting a price on the use of medical fa-
cilities and personnel for every intervention was a way
to increase cost-sensitivity. And as the centre housed
both medical and research facilities the question about
the overhead costs arose there too: ‘[S]o at a certain
moment, it was buzzing around, like: We have to do
performance-based financing because they are doing it
too’ (financial controller 1).
Second, performance-based financing went beyond
performance-based funding in doubling the amount of
money that was distributed based on research results.
The fund to reimburse departments for their perfor-
mance was split into two equal parts—one relatively
fixed, the othermore variable. The first half of the budget
was allocated based on the number of associate and full
professors employed at the department compared to the
total number of full-time jobs at the medical centre. The
second half was variable and allocated based on quanti-
tative performance indicators. The range of potential in-
dicators was restricted: ‘There are not that many param-
eters available in the world of research that can also be
measured well, to put it that way. So, then…you soon fall
back upon the happy few’ (financial controller 2). After
many rounds of consultation with researchers and finan-
cial controllers, the board decided upon the following
four performance indicators in 2016: ‘acquisition power,’
‘doctorates,’ ‘author force,’ and ‘score top publications’
(see Table 1 for an overview). 40 percent of the variable
research budget was reserved for ‘acquisition power’
and 20 percent for the other three indicators. The overall
score of a department vis-à-vis other departments deter-
mined its so-called ‘market share’ in the budget (docu-
ment 2). In addition to the algorithmic allocation model,
these performance indicators were also used to flag the
position of the centre in the international research land-
scape and included in the hiring and promotion guide-
lines for assistant, associate, and full professors (docu-
ment 7, 8 and 9).
The first two indicators are concerned with the finan-
cial and human resources that departments themselves
are able to attract. The indicator ‘acquisition power’ cov-
ers the success of a department in bidding for external
grants. The ability to attract such grants has become
important in the Dutch academic system over the past
Table 1. Overview of interviews, focus groups, and documents.
Interviews and
focus groups Participants Date
Interview 1 Three advisors research policy December 27, 2017
Interview 2 Dean February 8, 2018
Focus Group 1 Six early career researchers (four PhD students, two postdoctoral researchers) June 18, 2018
Focus Group 2 Eight senior researchers (two assistant professors, four associate professors, June 18 2018
and two full professors)
Interview 3 Advisor research policy 1 December 11, 2018
Interview 4 Advsisor research policy 2 December 11, 2018
Interview 5 Professor 1 March 13, 2019
Interview 6 Financial controller 1 March 19, 2019
Interview 7 Professor 2 March 19, 2019
Interview 8 Financial controller 2 March 27, 2019
Interview 9 Professor 3 April 19, 2019
Interview 10 Professor 4 May 16, 2019
Documents Brief description
Document 1 Annual report 2017
Document 2 Internal memo on allocation model, 2018
Document 3 Internal presentation on allocation model, 2015
Document 4 Internal presentation on performance indicators, 2016
Document 5 Strategic five-year plan, 2018
Document 6 Dissertation on early developments in resource allocation, 2009
Document 7 Hiring and promotion guideline for assistant and associate professor
Document 8 Hiring and promotion guideline for full professor
Document 9 Online presentation of the center
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 15–25 18
two decades as universities becamemore dependent on
the ability of individual researchers to successfully at-
tract the resources—and the ensuing individual and insti-
tutional prestige—to carry out larger research projects.
The acquisition power of a department is calculated by
taking the three-year average of the grants acquired. The
second indicator—’doctorates’—covers the relative suc-
cess of a department in attracting and supervising PhD
students. More than just a reward, the resources are
also meant to compensate departments for the insuffi-
cient government funding for PhDs. The indicator is cal-
culated by taking the mean number of dissertations de-
fended at a department over the past three years. The
final two cover scientific output and are somewhat more
laborious. The third indicator is called ‘author force’ and
covers the publication successes of researchers in terms
of quantity and impact. The author force of a depart-
ment is calculated by multiplying the number of arti-
cles published over the past three years with the Mean
Normalized Citation Score (MNCS). The MNCS is a score
that expresses the scientific impact of a set of publica-
tions in a particular subfield of research by comparing
the citations it managed to attract with what is normal in
that subfield. Because articles in (bio)medicine are usu-
ally written by a group of researchers, the articles are
weighted differently according to the position of the au-
thors. The fourth indicator is the ‘score top publications’
and covers publications in the highest quartile of scien-
tific journals. The centre uses the ranking of journals by
Clarivate Analytics to determine whether a publication
belongs to the top one percent—valued highest in the
model—or to some other percentile. Again, the depart-
ment receives money based on the position of the au-
thors on the articles in question (see Table 2).
4. In Support of Algorithmic Allocation:
Market Fairness
Algorithmic allocation has been the preferred—though
contested—model to distribute resourceswithin the cen-
tre over the course of two decades. That continuity is
the starting point for teasing out some of its norma-
tive underpinnings. In particular, this section analyses
the place of ‘market fairness’ in providing a rationale to
support algorithmic allocation. That concept of market
fairness extends the idea that markets are not just eco-
nomic phenomena out there in the world, but equally
important as a reference point in the normative con-
siderations that we draw upon to support particular
ideas of merit and fairness in an organizational or po-
litical context (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006; Fourcade &
Healy, 2007). Following that line of thought, researchers
and policymakers do not literally refer to the university
medical centre as a marketplace but do draw upon a
range of market-oriented considerations to elaborate on
the fairness of this allocation model. Algorithmic alloca-
tion was justified negatively in terms of the past injus-
tices it sought to make up for, and justified positively
in terms of the principles—exchange, competition, and
incentivization—that should prevail when distributing re-
sources fairly and effectively.
In negative terms, market fairness is about eliminat-
ing unfair advantages emanating from past decisions to
privilege one department at the cost of others. When
people have been granted something, one professor re-
marks, they are not very eager to let go of it. Over
time, this creates disparities between departments: ‘[S]o
there are some historical budgets which makes it diffi-
cult sometimes….You do run into inequalities. Not ev-
eryone is always equal, I say at such moments’ (profes-
sor 4). The former dean favoured algorithmic allocation
because it would ameliorate this situation. As another
professor who was close to the whole operation recalls:
That’s also what he explicitly said: ‘It is all on historical
grounds that this department gets this much money
and that department that much. That is not fair. I will
reconsider it all. And I will put it all in a variable fund
and then we will see.’ Under the guise of: ‘This is fair.’
(professor 2)
Table 2. Schematic overview of the allocation model (based on document 2).
Indicator Acquisition Dissertations Author Force Top Publications
Weight 40% 20% 20% 20%
Formula funds #doctorates (P × A) ×MNCS (P × A) × QW
Explanation The amount of The number of ‘P’ stands for the number ‘P’ (see previous indicator)
funding acquired dissertations of articles ‘A’ (see previous indicator)
from research defended at a ‘A’ stands for author position: QW’ stands for a ranking of
organizations and department • First author: 30% ‘journals based on the Journal
patient organizations • Second author: 20% Impact Factor (provided by
• Last author: 20% Thomson Reuters):
• Other authors: 30% • Top 1% of journals: 2
(distributed equally) • Top 1–5% of journals: 1,5
‘MNCS’ stands for Mean • Top 5–10% of journals: 1,0
Normalized Citation Score • Top 10–25%: 0,5
• Lower than top 25%: 0
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Variability in the funding of departments offered a way
out of inequality—but so was quantification. Originally,
the historical budgets emerged from rival claims for
more resources that were expressed in words, ‘there are
quite a lot of researchers and they all want to say to the
dean: “I conduct the best research in the world.” So yes,
then quantitative is attractive’ (professor 1). The quantifi-
cation of research output offers the dean a way to stay
clear of allocation decisions based on verbal claims of re-
search excellence.
The search for quantitative performance indicators
was negatively justified with reference to historical bud-
gets but algorithmic allocation was predominantly justi-
fied in positive terms. The first positive consideration of
market fairness is about the ideal of the organization as
being a site of exchange. A key novelty of the allocation
model was its integration of both overhead costs and re-
search output. The internal presentation that launched
the search for the best performance indicators specified
that one should pay a price for the services used—the
use of office space and research facilities—and be re-
warded for the things one delivers. On the one hand,
there is a select set of researchers who take the lead:
‘The head of department is responsible for ideas and re-
search (results) and buys resources and support services
from resource departments’ (document 3). Reasoning
from the perspective of the heads of department, a re-
source is defined as the ‘capacity that facilitates or sup-
ports the execution of research ideas and projects or that
independently engages in activities for the benefit of re-
search’ (document 3). On the other hand, there are re-
source departments who offer goods and services to re-
searchers. Reasoning from the perspective of these ser-
vice providers, a resource is defined as a ‘service or ac-
tivity for which there is an internal transfer price’ (docu-
ment 3). In building a rationale for algorithmic allocation,
the exchange of resources was presented as a key orga-
nizational principle.
In addition to exchange, algorithmic allocation builds
on the idea of ‘achievement through competition’ which
ensures that the best performing researchers are re-
warded while those who perform less well will see their
resources decrease. As a matter of fairness, perform-
ing in a competitive environment is about doing ‘jus-
tice’ to what someone has accomplished: ‘The idea of
performance-based financing is an allocation of the ben-
efits that does justice to your achievements’ (financial
controller 1). The value of competition is also visible in
the decision to exclude resources attracted frompharma-
ceutical companies in the indicator ‘acquisition power.’
The Centre admitted that acquiring money from indus-
try was an achievement in itself but argued that money
from scientific and patient organizations still had a dif-
ferent status because it was ‘acquired in (scientific) com-
petition’ (document 3). Competition is more than a fea-
ture of research management. The long history of algo-
rithmic allocation, one professor says, tells us something
about ourselves as researchers too in the sense that ‘we
are competitive but we do also want to be rewarded for
our performance’ (professor 4). The recent decision to re-
strict algorithmic allocation, for instance, thus led to feel-
ings of wrongdoing: ‘But now that it is reversed so much
you see that we, as staff, say: “Well, yes, if your perfor-
mance is not financed that is quite difficult too. Because
that does not feel right”’ (professor 4). In elaborating on
that feeling, (s)he adds: ‘Well, we too often had the feel-
ing that in particular the people who would grow or did
well would get into trouble. Plus…you want to have the
feeling that you are rewarded for achieving something’
(professor 4).
A third, motivational justification of market fairness
is about ‘offering incentives for innovation’ to depart-
ments such that they will be induced to strive for excel-
lence under similar conditions. The explicit objective of
algorithmic allocation is ‘to reward and stimulate good
performances’ and to offer ‘an incentive for the optimal
organization’ of the Centre’s research infrastructure (doc-
ument 1; document 4). Under the heading of ‘steering on
incentives,’ themedical Centre spoke of the need to steer
on ‘the quality of the output’ and ‘the societal impact
of research’ as well as the ability to stay ‘within the re-
search budget’ and be ‘in line with the focal areas of the
centre’ (document 3). Under that same heading, incen-
tives were evoked as a reason to include citation scores
of publications in the allocation model: ‘As a firm, we
wanted a higher MNCS. So how do you do that? Well,
you will be steering your department in that direction’
(financial controller 1). Again, incentives are not just a
matter of research management. They are also evoked
by researchers themselves when they express the need
for an environment in which innovation is stimulated in-
stead of hampered:
You just have to strike the right balance because you
do need the incentives such that people…that peo-
ple are not part of a too big organizational unity that
becomes too inert and bureaucratic. You do want to
have the incentives to be innovative and to set up new
things. (professor 4)
To be induced to innovate fairly requires uniformity in
the opportunities to conduct research. In that regard, in-
centives also offered an important justification for charg-
ing for the overhead costs. This should happen uniformly
throughout the organization because departments with
more clinical duties might place their healthcare person-
nel in rooms officially reserved for research if these came
at no cost. As one administrator recalls: ‘Yes, we have
tried beforehand to avoid these kinds of perverse incen-
tives, as we called them at the time, not to strengthen
these incentives too’ (financial controller 1). All in all, in-
centives figure prominently in the attempt to build a ra-
tionale for algorithmic allocation.
There are clearly pragmatic reasons to opt for an al-
gorithmic model to allocate resources for (bio)medical
research. The financial reorganization in healthcare, for
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instance, was an important pragmatic factor for charg-
ing for the overheads in research too. The weight of ac-
quisition power in the model, moreover, is not just to
induce researchers to attract as many external grants
as possible—though that is certainly part of it—but
also because these grants have to be matched to in-
ternal resources in order to be viable (document 3).
But placing these pragmatic reasons aside, this section
demonstrated how both administrators and researchers
justify the need for algorithmic allocation in market-
oriented terms: to break with the alleged unfairness
of historical budgets; to maintain the idea of achieve-
ment through competition; to incentivize innovation un-
der similar conditions, and to do so in an organizational
context of exchange where prices and responsibilities
are well-defined.
5. Challenging Algorithmic Allocation:
Epistemic Fairness
Algorithmic allocation became controversial soon after
its implementation. The biomedical departments, in par-
ticular, had difficulties in attracting external grants and
their resources further declined—due to the weight of
acquisition power in the model—until their very survival
was at stake (financial controller 1 and 2; professor 2).
In 2018, the new board of directors decided to reduce
the variable budget from 50 to 10 percent and to limit
departmental competition (document 2). The decision
to put algorithmic allocation on hold—instead of letting
departments go bankrupt—shows that market fairness
only reaches so far intomatters of researchmanagement.
In fact, researchers and administrators have brought a
range of issues to the fore to problematize algorithmic
allocation and its normative underpinnings. These con-
siderations of ‘epistemic fairness’ all hinge on the idea
that there are differences in the practices of produc-
ing scientific knowledge (Borgman, 2017; Franssen et al.,
2018; Hessels et al., 2019; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). Or as one
professor expressed it: ‘Yes, I do not mind the discus-
sion about benchmarking, about comparisons. You have
to be proud of your output. But you have to look a lit-
tle bit at the diversity, at how science is done’ (profes-
sor 1). Biomedical scientists, for one, work primarily in
laboratories on a wide range of biological processes at
the level of cells, proteins, and DNA. As preclinical or
‘basic’ research, biomedicine is often quite far removed
from direct healthcare applications and requires a lot
of equipment, animals, and chemicals. The health sci-
ences, on the other hand, are a less capital-intensive
branch of research—computers and databases suffice
here. Engaged in the science of large numbers, health
scientists study the association between health-related
variables in large cohorts of people. The health sciences
have a role in some screening programs but are often
more aligned with prevention—and hence with regional
and national policymaking—than with clinical practice.
Such epistemic differences lead to four considerations
of fairness that problematize—or directly challenge—the
market-oriented justifications which have been analysed
so far.
To start with, the various departments differ signif-
icantly in publication output and their typical citation
impact. In certain fields, individual journal publications
can be produced with relatively little effort. Writing an
article can, for example, entail performing a set of rel-
atively standardized statistical analyses applied to data
that were not generated by the authors themselves. This
contrasts with the significant amounts of effort that can
go into conducting more practical experimental studies
performed in other fields: ‘If you are doing cell biology,
it’s extremely difficult to get a paper. And if you work in
big databases, then you can get twenty papers. So, I think
especially universities should understand and acknowl-
edge that’ (junior researcher 1). The administrative staff
is also aware of differences in publication practices:
As a joke I always say, I exaggerate of course:
You have a fundamental-orientated department who
work their butts off for one publication. And you have
a life science department who can put its computer
on in the morning and, hop, there we have another
publication from the database….And what you notice
then—that is, if you don’t discriminate between differ-
ent types of research—is that fundamental research is
being eaten up because they have less output. (finan-
cial controller 2)
Our respondents also touched onmore subtle aspects of
epistemic fairness in the use of publication-related met-
rics. One administrator, for example, mentioned the ex-
ample of a field whose relatively small-scale organiza-
tional structure has resulted in very high MNCS scores.
Conversely, in some cases, citation scores are normal-
ized for a broader set of specialities that can make
the output of a given department look underwhelming
in comparison.
If you are in a niche-field like child medicine, to name
one, you never have a high MNCS score because you
are competing in internalmedicine, you know. So they
can never score on this….So in that sense, it is unfair
competition. (financial controller 2)
Furthermore, some of our respondents were concerned
with the fact that a focus on output and citation results
makes cooperation among departments less visible: ‘But
you can ask yourself: Okay, this department does not
publish that much but they are actually pretty impor-
tant for the medical centre because they have this spe-
cific expertise that many other departments, in fact, do
make use of’ (professor 2). A department, for instance,
might provide data or other resources that are crucial for
the work of others but ‘if you are stuck to performance-
based financing [then] you are at a point of losing such a
department’ (professor 2).
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Secondly, scientists also clearly experience the com-
petition for a larger market share as something that
exerts a certain pressure on them: ‘The department
gets a financial kind of award, I guess, per publication,
right?…So that’swhere the pressure starts, right?’ (junior
researcher 2). In their eyes, this leads them away some-
times from fair and responsible behaviour. For one, it in-
forms publication practices and increases the rivalry over
authorship positions:
There is the performance-based financing, so it will
get worse and worse because we get the [name scien-
tometric institute], the citation, theMNCS. For our de-
partment, for example, it will be much better to pub-
lish in lower impact [journals], because it is too diffi-
cult [otherwise], and have more papers. And then we
should claim all the first and lasts because otherwise
our department will lose money for research and we
have to fire people. (senior researcher 1)
In the focus group setting, another senior researcher re-
sponded by saying that the allocation model leads to
a very particular kind of creativity: ‘We all are creative
then tomake sure we get this performance-based financ-
ing, this additional funding. But is it really responsible
science? That’s the question’ (senior researcher 2). One
of the key ways to be responsible is to address a (sci-
entific) audience that your results are most relevant for.
Due to the exclusive focus on publications in the highest
quartile of journals, however, other kinds of considera-
tions easily take over. One of the things that (bio)medical
scientists reflect upon is the instrumental way in which
they seize upon epistemic differences between fields:
‘Q1 is determined for a disciplinary field. So you shop
around there. So sometimes it is: Oh, now I need to pub-
lish in a biology journal because there I can still pub-
lish in Q1, whereas in immunology it is not possible’ (ju-
nior researcher 3). Adding to this practice of ‘shopping
around,’ another researcher points to a tension between
publishing in higher-ranked journals and finding a suit-
able audience:
But then, if you think back on the responsible re-
searcher and you shop around because you want to
publish in theQ1 journals. But it might not be the jour-
nal which is most suitable for your research and with
the readers….It is something strange you do.’ (junior
researcher 4)
Differences in the perception of the value of differ-
ent publication outlets—again bound up with field
differences—also permeate the relationship between ju-
nior and senior researchers:
For me, it’s actually quite tricky….For my future, it is
better to publish in more scientific journals. But it’s
easier to publish in Q1 in less scientific journals. So
my PI [principal investigator] wants to publish in these
journals while I want to publish in the more scientific
journals. (junior researcher 1)
In reflecting upon daily decision-making on the scien-
tific shop floor, the algorithmic allocation model is ex-
plicitly related to the struggle over authorship positions
and to attempts to ‘creatively’ seize upon epistemic dif-
ferences in publication and citation patterns between
different (bio)medical fields. The placing of authorship
within the allocation model at least gives institutional le-
gitimacy to the (perceived) pressure to secure good au-
thorship positions in order to add to the market share
of the department—but it might equally contribute to a
struggle over authorship positions.
A third important aspect of epistemic fairness relates
to an unequal ability of departments to attract resources
beyond the confines of the medical Centre. The reason
for this is the highly diverse structure of academic and
commercial funding opportunities across fields.
For [some] discipline[s] it is way easier to acquire ex-
ternal funding. Of course, there is a lot of competi-
tion but the total availability of funding for oncology,
for example, is much larger than for medical ethics or
plastic surgery. How can you use the same measuring
rod? (research policy advisor 1)
One interviewee contends that differences in the access
to external resources make for ‘a really difficult balance’
in the allocation model because ‘some research can get
money more easily than other research’ (professor 4).
This interviewee perceives this as having to do with how
‘sexy’ the research is: ‘I always say that you just have an
easier time when you do something with pitiful children
or cancer’ (professor 4). More fundamentally, access dif-
fers between clinical research on the one hand and ba-
sic research in biomedicine and the health sciences on
the other. Research with greater relevance for clinical
practice, for instance, is depicted as a ‘completely dif-
ferent branch of sports’ due to the access that the clin-
ical departments have to the resources of pharmaceuti-
cal companies:
[Y]ou also have to realize…that big pharma is on top
of it; it pours a lot of money into it. And a lot of money
goes specifically to these departments. Yeah, they can,
of course, deliver these pharma outcomes, but they
can also partly use that money and fund other re-
search projects that would maybe not get funded oth-
erwise. (professor 2)
A further complicating factor is that according to some of
our subjects, more fundamental forms of research tend
to encounter difficulty in convincing patient organiza-
tions of the value of their work. This was perceived as an
additional source of imbalance in the overall distribution
of funds across (bio)medical research, with the current
algorithmic allocation system reinforcing the problem:
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And in my field—I’m working on a pretty molecular
level, so patients, of course, don’t see the relevance
in that….So what’s happening now, looking at all the
VENI’s andVIDI’s [major Dutch research grants], is that
a lot of proposals closer to the clinic get the money
because, whatever….And now we don’t really notice
the effect but in ten years we will definitely notice it.
(junior researcher 1)
Fourth and finally, our interviewees point to differences
in the average duration of doctorates between fields and
terms of how successful departments can claim to be
in supervising graduate students. As a general rule, doc-
torates in clinical fields tend to take less time than in
biomedical fields:
Concerning doctorates, that takes five years on average
at a biomedical department while it takes three years
in the clinic….So you actually have very specific norms
per group or per research field about what you need to
really do. Because if you have the same measuring rod
for everything, then, yeah, you destroy more than you
achieve according to me. (financial controller 1)
Interviewees account for such differences by referring
to the greater degree of unpredictability of laboratory-
based research. One professor explained that unexpected
outcomes of experiments are common and can signifi-
cantly delay graduation or even lead students to give up
while this is less common in the more clinical areas:
Look, we, of course, have departments…where it is
way easier to channel PhD students. It is a kind of doc-
torate factory. And in the laboratory, it is plodding on
and if something fails then a whole doctorate might
fail. That is quite a difference. (professor 4)
In summary, the considerations presented in this section
draw on perceived differences in the practices of knowl-
edge production to confront the quantitative indicators
at the heart of algorithmic allocation (see also Rushforth
& de Rijcke, 2015). Following this line of reasoning, de-
partments no longer appear as organizational units that
can compete fairly based on a set of uniform perfor-
mance indicators covering doctorates, external grants,
and the number and scientific impact of publications.
6. Conclusions
In our article, we addressed an analytical question cen-
tral to higher education as it is managed and experi-
enced nowadays: What kinds of normative considera-
tion do researchers and administrators draw upon to jus-
tify or challenge algorithm-based allocation? To answer
that question, we untangled two rival notions of fairness
that were at play in research management. The long his-
tory and continuous importance of performance-based
financing at our university medical centre first led us to
four considerations ofmarket fairness: Eliminating the ar-
bitrary interference that has previously privileged some
departments at the cost of others; installing achievement
through competition as insurance that the best depart-
ments were rewarded while those who performed less
well saw their resources decrease; introducing incentives
to induce innovative research and to stimulate depart-
ments to excel under similar conditions; and reconfigur-
ing the research organization as a site of exchangewhere
people pay for the services used and receive money for
the things they deliver.
The decision to put algorithmic allocation on hold led
us to the second series of normative considerations that
problematized the idea that it resulted in a fair distribu-
tion of resources. These considerations of epistemic fair-
ness, as we called them, build on the idea that a univer-
sity medical centremight be unified in its focus on health
and disease but very diversified in its cultures of knowl-
edge production and their affordances and constraints
(Borgman, 2017; Franssen et al., 2018; Hessels et al.,
2019; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). Differences in the publication
practices between different (bio)medical fields was the
first normative issue brought to the fore as a challenge
to the alleged fairness of the allocation model. In addi-
tion, researchers linked the insistence onQ1 publications
and the importance of authorship positions in themodel
to struggles between researchers to secure the best po-
sition and to tensions at the heart of their decision to
publish in one journal or another. Third, researchers and
administrators pointed to differences in the ability of de-
partments in different fields to attract external resources.
Finally, they singled out the ‘doctorate’ as a research
trajectory that had a different temporal and risk-related
meaning for different PhD students and departments.
When we bring these considerations together, the orga-
nization appears as somethingmore than a site of compe-
tition, incentivization, and exchange. Instead, those with
decision-making power should account for differences in
publication practices, doctoral research, and access to re-
sources, and acknowledge that research is not just a mat-
ter of competitive achievements of otherwise homoge-
neous departmental units.
The case of algorithmic allocation at a university
medical centre does not stand on its own. It fits in
with broader trends of quantification,marketization, and
algorithm-based decision making in higher education—
as well as in society more broadly. On the one hand,
our analysis corroborates earlier findings about the im-
portance of indicators and rankings for research man-
agement as well as the spread of market-oriented ide-
als and practices in the current organization of research
(Hammarfelt et al., 2017; Paradeise & Filliatreau, 2016;
Rushforth & de Rijcke, 2015, 2017; Sauder & Espeland,
2009). By untangling considerations of market fairness,
we were able to better understand the appeal of com-
petition and quantitative performance indicators for al-
location purposes. On the other hand, however, our
analysis of epistemic fairness shows that we should be
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careful in depicting higher education as populated by
‘market universities’ fully enmeshed in ‘epistemic capital-
ism’ (Berman, 2012; Birch, 2017; Fochler, 2016; Slaughter
& Rhoades, 2009). Although these trends definitely in-
fluence research organizations, they remain heteroge-
neous institutions in which rival normative considera-
tions are at play (Paradeise & Thoenig, 2018; Rushforth
et al., 2018; Whitley, Gläser, & Engwall, 2010). Beyond
the specifics of the case, our analytic distinction between
market fairness and epistemic fairness thus provides in-
sights into the relative instability and (potential) room
for manoeuvre of research organizations. The normative
tension we discerned offers a way into the internal dy-
namics of organizational debates and—possibly—a way
out of the limitations that marketization, quantification,
and algorithms impose.
The current state of the allocation model at the
Centre provides an interesting test case of how to deal
with normative tensions in a broader ‘algorithmic cul-
ture’ (Striphas, 2015). The future of performance-based
financing at the centre is still undecided. Algorithmic al-
location is currently severely restricted, but the board of
directors has tasked a special committee to reconsider
performance-based financing and there is a push from
the heads of department to slowly bring it up to its for-
mer level. The broader literature on computation and al-
gorithms could offer interesting perspectives for consid-
eration by decision-makers in higher education and else-
where (Berman & Hirschman, 2018; Finn, 2017; van Dijck,
2013). We flag two specific sources of concern. The first
concerns the way institutions should sustain wider legiti-
macy and be held ‘algorithmically accountable’ (Couldry,
2016). The partial or full delegation of human decision
making to automation raises profound questions about re-
sponsibility and accountability for the outcomes of these
decisions. Are decision-makers fully able to understand
the algorithms and their consequences? And can they
still explain to others that the decision made sense when
they are prompted to do so? The second issue concerns
the way to deal with rival considerations of fairness in
designing, implementing, and reviewing algorithms. Our
case demonstrates that there are crucial differences in the
way people justify or problematize algorithm-based deci-
sion making. Can we expect algorithms to ever resolve
the normative tensions that divide organizations and hu-
man societies? Or do algorithms aggravate such tensions
because some considerations are more easily embodied
while others are pushed to the side? These two sources of
concern, accountability and normativity, are not so easily
addressed. But we do expect them to appear and reap-
pear whenever and wherever algorithm-based decision
making predominates—in higher education institutions
as well as in other areas of social life.
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